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THE THEORY OF OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREAS AND THE RAND*
B. C. MUZOREWA
At the present moment, the Rand Currency area (composed of Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa) is under serious review by its members. 
The fact that the present arrangements are being re-examined suggests that 
improvements of one kind or another are being sought. In fact, there have been 
two commissions of enquiry on behalf of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
into the pros and cons of maintenance of the status quo. Since Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland are politically independent, it is quite normal for these 
countries to wish to have their own currencies instead of the Rand. Indeed, 
monetary-fiscal independence (though it may be limited) is an important 
attribute and parameter of national sovereignty.
The purpose of this short paper is to examine the Rand Currency arrange­
ments in terms of the “Theory of Optimum Currency Areas” . My hope is that 
this exercise will throw additional light on the functioning of the present 
currency and monetary arrangements. It is also hoped that this paper will 
help in the shaping of future relationships.
The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas
Some international economists have developed an excellent exposition 
of the Theory of Optimum Currency areas, t A currency area has been defined 
as one within which there is a single currency regime or an area of national 
currencies on a fixed exchange-rate system, with guaranteed convertibility. 
Such a territory is said to be optimum if full-employment, price stability and 
external balance can simultaneously be realised with the aid of monetary-fiscal 
instruments and flexible rates of exchange with the rest of the world.
For example, let us assume that a common currency area is composed 
of two countries—A and B—with zero trade balance, full-employment and 
price stability. There is factor immobility between A and B. Now a fall in 
demand (due to changes in tastes, etc.) for A’s products and a rise in demand 
for B’s products will result in excess demand for factors of production in B, 
tending to raise factor and commodity prices there. A experiences a trade 
deficit while a surplus emerges in B. Excess supply of factors of production 
appears in A, tending to lower factor prices and therefore commodity prices. 
If the price mechanism was permitted to do its work, demand in the area 
would shift to the now cheaper goods in A, thus stimulating production and 
employment in this country. Unemployment and trade deficit in A could be 
eliminated and thus equilibrium can be restored in both countries.
However in the present-day world economy, factor and commodity prices 
are not permitted to move sufficiently in directions indicated above. For 
example, prices in B may not be allowed to rise to sufficient levels for the price *1
* Mr. C. Stahl and students o f International Economics at the University of Botsw ana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland deserve my sincere gratitude for the useful discussions I have had with them on this 
topic.
1 R. Mundell, “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”, American Economic Review, 1961, 
60, pp. 657-665: R. McKinnon, “Optimum Currency Areas” , American Economic Review, 1963, 
53, pp. 717-725; P. Kenen, “The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View”, In: 
R. Mundell and A. Swoboda, eds., Monetary Problems of the International Economy (University of 
Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 41-60; D. Snider, Optimum Adjustment Processes and Currency Areas 
(Princeton University Press, Essays in International Finance Section, I To. 62, October, 1967).
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mechanism to restore equilibrium. Thus, if monetary and fiscal instruments 
are applied in B to check inflation, then trade deficit and unemployment in A 
will persist, unless factor prices in A can be reduced sufficiently. If country A 
has no institutional arrangements which make factor prices inflexible, it is 
possible for unemployment to be eliminated via a sufficient fall in the money 
wage rate. However, minimum wage laws and trade union action might make 
it difficult for the price of labour to fall. Under conditions of sticky factor prices 
in the downward direction in country A and application of disinflationary 
monetary and fiscal measures in B, unemployment is likely to persist in the 
former region. An attempt might be made to expand demand in A through 
an increase in money supply in an effort to raise production and employment. 
This approach would only result in defeating the disinflationary measures in B. 
Unemployment and inflation cannot be eliminated at the same time under the 
above conditions.
It would appear, therefore, that if factors of production were very mobile 
between the two countries, excess-demand for and excess-supply of factors 
would not exist for long in B and A, respectively. The optimum currency area 
theorists would say that these two countries should have separate currencies 
with flexible exchange rates between them, unless a high degree of factor 
mobility can be promoted between them.
The ideal adjustment process depends on several factors. According to 
Mundell, “An essential ingredient of a common currency, or a single currency 
area, is a high degree of factor mobility.” 2 3However, Kenen disagrees with this 
criterion on the grounds that perfect mobility of labour is usually rare. “Diver­
sity in a nation’s product mix, the number of single-product regions contained 
in a single country, may be more relevant than labour mobility.” 3 Thus, a less 
diversified economy may have to alter its national exchange rate more fre­
quently than other economies. This is because a single export product economy 
is bound to be exposed to external shocks arising from changes in demand or 
technology abroad. Production of a number of export products means that the 
amplitude of fluctuations in export receipts is likely to be less than otherwise. 
“At any point in time, a country can expect to suffer significant reversals in 
export performance, but also to enjoy significant successes.” 4 5Thus, from 
Kenen’s point of view ability to produce a wide range of products is an essential 
qualification of an optimum currency area. Diversification is also a “pre­
requisite to the internal factor mobility that Mundell has emphasized.” 5 Since 
it is a prerequisite to the internal factor movement, it would appear that the 
difference between Mundell and Kenen is merely one of emphasis.
Earlier on it was mentioned that ideal adjustment also requires the use of 
appropriate monetary-fiscal instruments. It is possible for independent mone­
tary and fiscal authorities to co-ordinate their policies in order to achieve 
equilibrium. “More realistically, however, it can be fulfilled only if there 
is a single monetary-fiscal authority.” ® It appears, therefore, that a fully co­
ordinated or single monetary and fiscal authority is also an essential require­
ment for an ideal currency area.
2 Mundell, Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, pp. 661.
3 Kenen, op cit., p. 49.
* Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 54.
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To sum up, for an area to qualify as an optimum one the following main 
criteria should be met: first, there must be a single monetary-fiscal authority 
within the currency area or a high degree of co-ordination of independent 
monetary-fiscal policies; and second, a high degree of factor mobility must 
prevail within the area in order to avoid substantial unemployment. It is these 
two criteria which will be used to examine the optimality of adjustment in 
Southern Africa. By no means does it mean that these are the only qualifications 
but these appear to be the most important ones.
The Rand Currency Area
Within the Rand area, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) are far 
less developed economically than the Republic of South Africa (SA). The 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is the sole issuer of the Rand circulating 
in the whole territory but it has no branches in Botswana, Lesotho and Swazi­
land. The question to be answered is, “Does the Rand domain fulfil the quali­
fications of an ideal currency area?”
A closer examination of the monetary arrangements in Southern Africa 
shows that the Reserve Bank of South Africa has effective control of the 
monetary situation within South Africa only. However, it does regulate the 
foreign exchange transactions since it is the sole issuer of the Rand. The com­
mercial banks in BLS generally conform to the monetary conditions (lending 
principles and interest rate changes in South Africa) but the South African 
monetary authorities do not control internal operations of these credit insti­
tutions. This is mainly because the banking firms in BLS (which are London 
based) are not legally bound to follow the SARB or Bank of England’s regula­
tions or directives—thus, banking firms in BLS are practically operating in a 
legal vacuum. If, in general, South African Reserve Bank monetary controls 
or regulations are ineffective in BLS, this would suggest that the currency 
area is not optimal, according to the first criterion—that is, the boundaries 
of the Rand circulation do not appear to coincide with the boundaries of 
effective monetary-fiscal control.
However, it is obvious that the lack of a formal agreement on monetary 
arrangements in Southern Africa may be the main factor making the policies 
of the South African monetary authorities ineffective in BLS.
Next, we must ask, “Will a formal agreement on monetary matters make 
the area an optimal one?” The answer is no, because there are other important 
economic conditions which must be fulfilled for the Rand Currency Area to be 
an optimal one.
At the end of the 19th Century all states in Southern Africa were on about 
the same level of economic development. But seventy-one years later, South 
Africa has evolved a more diversified one. What could have happened is that 
demand in the Rand area shifted in favour of South African and against BLS 
products, leading to a trade surplus and deficit, respectively. The result has 
been increased demand for South African factors of production, tending to 
raise factor and commodity prices there. A fall in demand for BLS products 
meant the appearance of excess supply of factors of production in these coun­
tries. Part of the unemployment has been absorbed by a limited movement of 
labour from the less developed to the more developed region (mainly in the 
form of migrant workers). However, this mobility of labour is reduced by the 
need for work permits and job reservation act in the Republic which makes 6
6 McKinnon, Optimum Currency Areas, p. 14.
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occupational flow very difficult, if not impossible in many cases. These insti­
tutional restrictions make the possibility of promoting a higher degree of 
mobility of labour remote, and it is unrealistic to expect that a common labour 
policy in the Rand area can be formulated.
In the absence of a high degree of flow of this factor of production, opti­
mum adjustment within Southern Africa would be possible if factor and 
commodity prices were free to rise in South Africa and to fall in BLS sufficiently. 
Such a development might shift demand from more expensive goods produced 
in the inflation-ridden region towards cheaper goods from the unemployment- 
ridden area. The fact is that the South African authorities have been applying 
monetary-fiscal instruments to disinflate the economy. It would not be in the 
interest of the South African economy for the monetary officials (even if it 
were legally possible) to expand money supply in BLS in order to relieve unem­
ployment there. BLS minimum wage laws could prevent sufficient fall in the 
already low money wage rate. Thus, a trade deficit and unemployment will 
persist in the less developed members of the area.
Because of the use of a common currency, capital has been more mobile 
than labour in Southern Africa. When investment opportunities declined in 
BLS as a result of a fall in demand for products of this area, capital funds 
generated here were free to move out into S.A. The existence of banking firms 
in the former region which are branches of credit institutions in the latter 
guaranteed the swift and smooth movement of savings within the Rand area. 
However, “Studies in many countries have shown how the banking system, if 
not regulated to act differently, tends to become an instrument for siphoning 
off the savings from the poorer regions to the richer and more progressive 
ones where returns on capital are high and secure.” 7 Deposits with BLS banks 
increase as a result of export earnings but are quickly lost to South African 
banks due to the very high propensity to import on the part of the former 
countries.7 8 An estimate of the outflow of capital funds generated in BLS is 
given by a rather low ratio of local advances to local deposits, which was 0,5 
for Botswana as at March, 1970; about 0,3 for Lesotho and 0,87 for Swaziland 
at the end of December, 1970.9 It must be mentioned that very little is known 
about the net long-term private capital movements. Though a common currency 
facilitates smooth movement of long-term capital, it cannot be relied upon 
to restore balance of payments of chronically undeveloped regions within the 
territory. “If an enduring decline in exports reduces incomes in a region, capital 
imports into the region cannot be expected to remedy the situation, and capital 
is more likely to move out.” 10 The mobility of capital has, however, also been 
reduced by legal and procedural means, especially when savings attempted to 
flow from the more developed to the less developed area. For example, until 
quite recently, South African Building Societies were not permitted to invest 
deposits mobilised in BLS outside their country. It is also believed that before 
1969, the movement of funds from S.A. to BLS in excess of R100 000 needed 
approval by the South African authorities. At the present time, residents of 
BLS are treated as non-residents of the Rand area for the purposes of con­
7 G. Myrdal, Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions (Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd. 
1957), p. 28.
8 J. Ingram, “State and Regional Payments Mechanisms”, Quarterly Journal o f  Economics, 
1959, LXXIII, pp. 619-632.
9 Botswana: National Development Plan 1970-1975, p. 10.
Lesotho: First Five-Year Development Plan 1970/71-1974/75, p. 15.
Swaziland: Annual Statistical Bulletin 1971, p. 57.
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trolling transactions in securities.10 1 Thus, the proceeds of a sale of South 
African securities by a resident of BLS to a South African resident are credited 
to a Blocked account.12 Although special consideration is given to all residents 
of BLS, the South African exchange control system is restrictive to the free 
flow of capital funds within the area under study. On the other hand, the less 
developed members of the Rand territory have taken and are taking measures 
to reduce the outflow of domestic savings to S.A., in order to engage in capital 
formation for economic growth within their borders.13 14These actions by all 
members of the area are very likely to reduce the mobility of capital.
The above description clearly indicates that the Rand Currency Area is 
not optimal, since it lacks the two most important ingredients of optimum 
adjustment—a high degree of factor mobility and an effective monetary and 
fiscal authority coinciding with the currency area. The possibility exists that 
the present currency arrangements could have been detrimental to the rapid 
economic development of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland for the past 
decades. The absence of a development orientated common monetary policy 
(in spite of the use of a single currency) has helped in perpetuating inequalities 
in the rates of economic growth in Southern Africa, and this is the main reason 
for the expressed concern by BLS about the direction and swiftness of the 
flow of capital. “In fact, one of the outstanding empirical regularities to be 
observed in the process of growth of countries which have long been unified 
is that some regions have persistently had higher unemployment and/or grown 
more slowly than others.” 1,1
10 B. Balassa, The Economic Theory of Economic Integration (George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1962) 
p. 256.
111.M.F. 21 st Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1970, pp. 50, 306, 455.
12 D. Franzsen et al, Report on Fiscal and Monetary Policy in South Africa 1970, pp. 253-254.
13 For expressed concern see Botswana: op. cit., p. 148; Lesotho First Five-Year Development 
Plan 1970/71-1974/75, p. 15.
14G. Magnifico, European Monetary Unification For Balanced Growth: A New Approach, 
In: Essays in International Finance, No. 88 (Princeton University Press, August 1971), p. 8.
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